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International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination
When Policy—Makers Disagree on the Model
ABSTRACT
The existing literature on international macroeconomic policy
coordination makes the unrealistic assumption that policy—makers all
know the true model, from which it follows in general that the Nash
bargaining solution is superior to the Nash non—cooperative solution.
But everything changes once we recognize that policy-makers' models
differ from each other and therefore from the "true" model. It is still
true that the two countries will in general be able to agree on a
cooperative policy package that each believes will improve the objective
function relative to the Nash non-cooperative solution. However, the
bargaining solution is as likely to move the target variables in the
wrong direction as in the right direction, in the light of a third true
model.
This paper illustrates these theoretical points with monetary
and fiscal multipliers taken from simulations of eight leading
international econometric models. (It is a sequel to NBER Working Paper
1925, which considered coordination between the domestic monetary and
fiscal authorities.) Here we first consider coordination between U.S.
and non—U.S. central banks. We find that out of 512. possible
combinations of models that could represent U.S. beliefs, non—U.S.
beliefs and the true model, coordination improves U.S. welfare in only
289 cases, reducing it in 206, and improves the welfare of other OECD
countries in only 297 cases, reducing it in 198. Then we consider
coordination with both monetary and fiscal policy. We find that out of
512 combinations, coordination improves U.S. welfare in 183 cases,
reducing it in 228, and improves the welfare of other OECD countries in
283 cases, reducing it in 219. A final section of the paper considers
possible extensions of the framework, dealing with uncertainty.
Jeffrey Frankel Katharine Rockett
Department of Economics Department of Economics
University of California University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720 Berkeley, CA 94720
(415) 642—8084International policy coordination has been the fastest-growing
research topic in the field of open-economy macroeconomics.1 The topic
owes its success to the happy marriage of the mathematical techniques of
game theory and the practical problem of coordination that has in the
mid—1980s become of central concern to international policy—makers.
Virtually all of the coordination literature has made the automatic
assumption that policy-makers agree on the true model of how the world
macroeconomy behaves. As a consequence, it has reached a very strong
conclusion: in general, countries will be better off it they coordinate
policies than they would be in the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium in
which each government sets its policies while taking those of the others
as given.2 The empirical literature is as yet less fully developed than
the theoretical literature. But it too has claimed gains from
coordination that, though small, are necessarily positive.3 If the case
in favor of coordination is indeed this clear, one might wonder at the
stupidity of governments in not pursuing it more seriously.
The assumption that policy—makers agree on the true model has
little, if any, empirical basis. Different governments subscribe to
different economic philosophies. If one wishes to think of actors as
perpetually processing new information in a Bayesian manner, so that
their models over time would converge on any given reality in the limit,
then one must admit that the speed of convergence is sufficiently slow,
or else that reality is changing sufficiently rapidly, that
policy-makers have not been able to reach agreement on the true model.
Nor is there much prospect of them doing so in the foreseeable future.
Professional economists are not much more able to agree on the
correct macroeconomic model than are policy—makers. A concrete—2--
illustration was offered by a recent exercise at the Brookings
Institution. Ralph Bryant and Dale Henderson asked those responsible
for twelve leading econometric models of the world economy to simulate
the effects of some carefully—specified policy changes.k The
predictions of the models varied widely as to both the magnitude and
the sign of the effects on output, inflation, exchange rates and current
account balances among trading partners and even in the country
originating the policy change. (See tables 1 and 6 below.) Obviously
no more than one of the models can be right, and it seems unlikely that
even one of them is in fact exactly right.
Lack of knowledge as to the true model helps explain a
troublesome fact. While support for the proposition that coordination
would improve welfare is widespread, proponents do not generally agree
on the nature of the Pareto-improving package of policy changes that is
called for in any particular set of circumstances. Some call for
coordinated expansion, some for coordinated discipline, some for
coordinated shifts in the mix between monetary and fiscal policy, and so
forth.5 Obviously if one sort of package would raise welfare, then
others would lower welfare. Disagreement, even within one country, as
to where the economy currently sits relative to the desired values of
the target variables is responsible f or some of the disagreement on the
desirable coordinated policy changes, but disagreement as to the correct
model is also a significant factor. As Branson (1986, 176) says, "With
this range of disagreement on economic analysis, how are the negotiators—3—
toreach agreement? The topic is one for the National Science
Foundation, not a new Bretton Woods."
One implication of the lack of agreement on the true model is,
of course, that "more research needs to be done." But the implications
for any policy coordination that might take place in the meantime are
considerably more interesting. This paper demonstrates two propositions
that hold when policy—makers disagree on the model. First, in contrast
to what one might think before careful reflection, such policy—makers
will in general be able to find a package of coordinated policy changes
that each believes will improve its country's welfare relative to the
sub—optimal Nash noncooperative equilibrium.6 Second, and in striking
contrast to the standard result when policy-makers agree on the model,
the package of coordinated policy changes could turn out to reduce
welfare, as judged by some true model of reality, as easily as raise it.
For example, using eight models from the Brookings simulations as models
which could represent the views of the U.S. government, the views of
other industrialized countries, or the true world macroeconomy, we find
that out of 512 possible combinations, monetary coordination perceptibly
improves U.S. welfare in only 289 cases, reducing it in 206 cases, and
improves the welfare of the other industrialized countries in only 297
cases, reducing it in 198.
The first two sections of the paper analyze a very simple game
where two countries, the United States and Europe, must decide how to
set their money supplies so as to come as close as possible to their
desired levels of two target variables: income and the current account—14—
(internal balance and external balance). Section 1 makes the two points
theoretically, that the two central banks will in general be able to
agree on a coordinated policy package that each thinks leaves its
country in a better position, and that the package might in fact leave
them in a worse position. Section 2 uses the multipliers from the eight
models in the Brookings simulations to provide a dramatic illustration-
of the points.
In section 3eachgovernment is given a second policy
instrument, government expenditure, to use, in addition to monetary
policy, and a third target variable, inflation, to pursue in addition to
income and the current account. Again we see that the governments will
in general find a coordinated policy package that they expect to improve
welfare, but that it could as easily have the opposite effect in
reality. Section $ considers extensions of the framework to deal with
the policy—maker's uncertainty regarding the true model, or the other
player's model, or both.—5—
Section 1: The Theory of Monetary Coordination with Disagreement
Here we assume that each country is interested in two target
variables: its own output, denoted y for the United States and y for
Europe (expressed relative to their optimum values and in log form), and
its current account balance, denoted x and x respectively (expressed as
a percentage of GNP and again relative to their optimums). Each
government seeks to minimize a quadratic loss function.
(1) W =y2+wx2
(2) =y*2+wx2
where w and u* denote the relative weights placed on external balance
versus internal balance.
We assume a general framework in which the targets are
linearly related to the available policy instruments, which in this
section are limited to the countries' money supplies, m and m*
respectively (in log form). We denote the parameters as perceived by
the U.S. authorities by a "us" subscript.
(3) y=Aus÷Cusm÷Eusm*
(14) x=Bus+Dusm+Fusm*




Since each country has only a single instrument but two
targets, it cannot unilaterally achieve Its targets. We begin by
considering the Nash non-000peraclve equilibrium. To ascertain U.S.—6—
behavior we differentiate (1) with respect to m, using (3) and ('4) and
holding m constant. It follows that the U.S. reaction function Is:
(7)m=M+Nm*,
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To ascertain European behavior we differentiate (2) with respect to rn,
using (5) and (6) and holding m constant. The European reaction
function is:
(8) m* =Q+Rm,
GK +w*H L ee e e
whereQ=- *
K+w L e e
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Figure 1 shows the two policy—makers' reaction functions,
equations (7) and (8). The optimum point as perceived by the U.S.
policy-makers is a point on its reaction function. Concentric




wherever they intersect the reaction function, because m is chosen so
that its marginal benefit given m* is zero. Similarly the optimum point
as perceived by the European policy-maker is a point E' and its
concentric indifference curves are horizontal wherever they intersect
its reaction function.
We have drawn the European reaction curve as steeper than the
U.S. curve. One might expect that the effects that are largest in
absolute value are the positive effects of money on domestic output: C
in equations (3) -()for the United States and K in equations (5)—(6)
for the non-U.S. OECD.7 It follows that, unless the welfare weight o on
the current account is large, the absolute value of the slope of the
U.S. reaction function is less than one when the U.S. money supply is on
the vertical axis, and vice versa for the European reaction function.
The possibilities for the sign of the slope are more diverse.
If monetary expansion is thought to be transmitted negatively to trading
partners (E < 0), presumably via a depreciation of the currency and
improvement in the trade balance of the expanding country as in the
Mundell—Fleming model, then the slope is positive: N > 0. If monetary
transmission is thought to be positive on the other hand CE > 0), then
the slope is ambiguous: when the welfare weight w on the current
account is small, the slope is negative, but when w is large, or when
the transmission multiplier E Is small (relative not only to the own
multiplier C, but also to the current account multipliers D and F), the
slope is again positive.(We are assuming that D and F, the effects of m
and m* on the domestic current account, are of opposite signs by symmetry.)—8—
The same analysis holds for the foreign reaction function
(e.g., I < 0 =>R> 0), though it must be remembered that even if any
given model is symmetric, the two reaction functions could easily have
opposite slopes. For example one country might believe that
transmission is negative and the other that it is positive. In figure 1
we have drawn the functions downward-sloping: a foreign expansion is
transmitted positively to the domestic country and so the domestic
government reacts by contracting.
The Nash equilibrium N is determined as the intersection of
the two reaction functions. At N the indifference curves cannot be
tangent, but must intersect, since their respective slopes are infinity
and zero. It follows that the Nash equilibrium is perceived as
Pareto—inefficient. Both policy—makers think they would be better off
if they could agree to move to a point within the "lens" determined by
the intersection of the two indifference curves.
As we have drawn the graph, each country would like to expand
but is afraid to do so on its own, presumably because of adverse
implications for the current account. But they can agree to expand
simultaneously, moving northeastward in the graph to higher levels of
perceived welfare. Such joint reflation is the kind of international
coordination that has been urged on Germany and Japan by the United
States under two different Administrations: in 1977—78, in the form of
the "locomotive theory," and in 1986 in the form of coordinated discount
rate cuts.8—9—
If an efficient mechanism of coordination exists, the
countries will move, not just northeastward, but specifically to one of'
the points on the contract curve, where the two countries' indifference
curves are tangent. There is no strong reason to choose any particular
point. Nor, for that matter, is there reason to think that any
Pareto-improving solution can necessarily be enforced. But we follow
much of the literature in consIdering the Nash bargainIng solution,
defined as the point where the product of the two countries' perceived
welfare gains, compared to the perceived welfare at the Nash
noncooperative solution, is maximized:
(11)Max (w5(m,m*) -W1(m m*rO) (We* (m,m*) -We(mn, m*rJ
=([(A5
+ m+Eu5rn*)2 +W (B5+Dusrn +Fusm*)2]
r n *n2 n *n2 —[(Au5






One would differentiate with respect to m and m* to find the bargaining
solution (mb, m*b), a point such as B in figure 2.
Once we recognize that the two policy—makers have different
models of the world, we must recognize that one, or both, will be wrong.— 10—
Toevaluate whether the bargaining solution B is superior to the
noncooperative solution (m", m*r) not just in perception but also in
reality, we would have to know the true parameter values, the output and
current account functions (3)—(6) without the subscripts:
(12) y =A+Cm+Em*
(13) x =B+Drn +F
(114) y=G+Im+Km*
(15) x =H+Jin +Lrn*
We would then plug mb and m*b into (12)—(15), and in turn plug the
target variables Into the loss functions (1) and (2), to see whether the
bargaining solution in fact improves welfare.
In the standard case where the policy-makers agree on the
correct model, coordination must necessarily improve welfare for each
country, or else its government would not have agreed to go along. In
our case, coordination may improve welfare. For example if the true
model is very close to that believed by the U.S. authorities, then the
true iso—welfare map will be very similar to the perceived indifference
curves shown in figure 1, and U.S. welfare will indeed be higher at B
than N. But this need not be the case.
The true optimum policy combination to maximize U.S. welfare
is given by differentiating (1) with respect to in(asin the derivation









If the true optimum point 0 is not at Ous but rather is as shown in
Figure 2, with the new set of true Iso—welfare curves drawn, then the
move from N to B could very well be In the wrong direction, resulting in
a reduction in U.S. welfare. Similarly If the true optimum policy
combination from the viewpoint of European Interests is not at e but
rather at P as shown In Figure 2, then coordination could reduce
European welfare as well.
It is worth considering momentarily the case when the two
policy—makers are seeking to maximize the identical objective function,
and disagree only about the proper model. For example they might be the
monetary and fiscal authority within the same country. Our two
propositions would still hold:(1) the two policy—makers will in
general be able to agree on a package of coordinated policy changes that
each thinks will improve the (same) country's welfare relative to the
Nash noncooperative solution, and (2) the package agreed to in
bargaining could in fact worsen welfare as easily as Improve it. This
is the case considered in Frankel (1986b).9 While in that paper
coordination arises solely from different perceptions, and in the
conventional literature it arises solely from different objectives, in
the present paper both factors are present.— 12—
Section2: Coordination with Eight International Econometric Models
How important for coordination Is the issue of' conflicting
models likely to be in practice? Is the case where bargaining reduces
welfare as judged by the true model merely a pathological
counterexample, or is it a likely occurrence? In what follows we use
theinternational simulation results of the macro—econometric models
that participated in the Brookings exercise to get an idea of what might
actually happen if governments coordinate.
The models were asked to show the effects of four experiments,
among others: an increase in the U.S. money supply, an increase in the
non—U.S. OECD money supply, an increase in U.S. government expenditure
and an increase in non-U.S. OECD government expenditure. In each case
the instructions were to hold the other policy instruments constant.
Though twelve models participated, some did not report effects on
current account balances, which we need along with effects on output
levels. The eight that we can use here are the Federal Reserve Board's
Multi—Country Model (MCM), Patrick Minford's Liverpool Model (LIVPL),
the Sims—Litterman Vector AutoRegression Model (VAR), the OECD's
Interlink Model (OECD), the Project Link Model (LINK), the
Mckibbon—Sachs Global Model (MSG), the EEC Commission's Compact Model
(EEC), and the Haas-Masson smaller approximation of the MCM model
(MINIMOD). These models are quite representative of the range of
econometric models actually in use, Including as they do models both
large and small in size, structural and nonstructural in approach,
Keynesian and neoclassical in philosophy, backward-looking andSimulation Effect
Table 1e.Monetary Policy
in Second Year of Increase in Money Supply (4 Percent)
Monetary Expansion
in U.S. (Sim. 0)
I CurrencyCA CA*j*
Y CPX (pta.) Value (Sb) (Sb)(pta.) CPI y*
Effect in U.S. Effect in Non—U.S.
MM +1.5%+0.4%—2.2 —6.0% —3.1—3.5—0.5—0.6%—0.7%
EEC 1/ +1.0%+0.8%—2.4 —4.0% —2.8 +1.2—0.5—0.4%+0.2%
EPA 2/ +1.2%+1.0%—2.2 —6.4% —1.6—10.1—0.6—0.5%—0.4%
LINK +1.0%—0.4%—1.4 —2.3% —5.9 +1.5 NA—0.1%—0.1%
Liverpool +0.1%+3.7%—0.3 —3.9%—13.0+0.1—0.1—0.0%—0.0%
MSG +0.3%+1.5%—0.8 —2.0% +2.6 —4.4—1.2—0.7%+0.4%
MINIMOD +1.0%+0.8%—1.8 —5.7% +2.8—4.7—0.1—0.2%—0.2%
VAR 3/ +3.0%+0.4%•—l.9 —22.9% +4.9+5.1+0.3+0.1%+0.4%
OECD +1.6%+0.7% —0.8 —2.6% —8.4 +3.1—0.1—0.1%+0.3%
Taylor 3/ +0.6%+1.2% —0.4 —4.9% NA NA—0.1 —0.2%—0.2%
Wharton +0.7%+0.0% —2.1 —1.0% —5.1+5.3—1.3—0.1%+0.4%






Effectin Non—U.S. Effectin U.S.
+1.5%+0.6%—2.1 —5.4% +3.5+0.1—0.2—0.2%—0.0%
EEC!! +0.8%+1.0%—1.0 —2.3% —5.2+1.9+0.0+0.1%+0.1%
EPA 2/ +0.0%+0.0% —0.1 —0.1% —0.1+0.1—0.0—0.0%+0.0%
Link 4/ +0.8% —0.6% NA —2.3% 1.4+3.5+0.0—0.0%+0.1%
Liverpool +0.4%+2.8%—0.9 —8.4% +7.1—8.2—1.1—3.4%+1.6%
HSG +0.2%+1.5% —0.7 —1.4%—15.9+12.0—1.2—0.6%+0.3%
MINIMOD +0.8%+0.2%—1.8 —4.8% +3.6—1.4—0.6—0.5%—0.3%
VAR 3/ +0.7%—0.5%—3.0 —5.5% +5.2—10.0+0.6—07Z+1.2%
OECD +0.8%+0.3%—1.3 —2.1% —1.6+2.3—0.2—0.1%+0.1%
Taylor 3/ +0.8%+0.7%—0.3 —3.5% NA NA—0.2—0.5%—0.1%
Wharton +0.2%—0.1%—0.8 +0.2% +2.6+0.5+0.0+0.0%+0.0%




Non—U.S. short—terminterest rate NA; long—term reported instead.
Non—U.S. current account is Japan, Germany. the United Kingdom, and Canada.
CPI NA.GNPdeflator reported instead
Appreciation of non—U.S. currency NA; depreciation of dollar reported insteadTable 1. Monetary Multipliers
(For two targets in each country)
Effecton Current
Percentage Effect Account(As Per—
on Income centageofGNP):
From a (1 percent)
increase in: U.S. m Eur. m U.S. m Eur. m
Effect on U.S. (C) (E) (D ) (F)
MCM 0.3750 0.0000 —0.0198 0.0006
Liverpool 0.0250 0.4000 —0.0832 —0.0525
VAR 0.7500 0.3000 0.0311 —0.0634
OECD 0.4000 0.0250 —0.0537 0.0147
LINK 0.2500 0.0250 —0.0380 0.0225
MSG 0.0750 0.0750 0.0167 0.0769
EEC 0.2500 0.0250 —0.0180 0.0122
MINIMOD 0.2500 —0.0750 0.0179 —0.0089
Effect on non—U.S.
OECD ("Europe") (I) (K) (J) CL)
MCM —0.1750 0.3750 —0.0090 0.0090
Liverpool 0.0000 0.1000 0.0034 0.2384
VAR 0.1000 0.1750 0.1169 0.1192
OECD 0.0750 0.2000 0.0178 —0.0091
LINK —0.0250 0.2000 0.0083 —0.0077
MSG 0. 1000 0.0500 —0.0206 —0.0743
EEC 0.0500 0.2000 0.0159 —0.0689
MINIMOD —0.0500 0.2000 —0.0226 0.0173— 13—
forward—lookingin expectations formation, European and American In
authorship, and public—sector and private—sector in function.
Table la reports the effects of monetary expansion on several
macroeconomic variables. The simulations showed effects over six years,
but ours is a static framework; we use only the effect in the second
year. (Two years is intended to be just long enough to get past the
negatIvepart of the "J—curve effect" oftheexchange rate onthe trade
balance.)Table1 reports the multipliers for output and the current
accountcalculated in the form that we need: as a percentage of GNP per
one percent change in the money supply. The models all agree that a
monetaryexpansion raises domestic output, but they agree on little else.
There is a surprising amount of disagreement, in particular, on whether
a monetary expansion improves or worsens the current account and, in
turn, on whether it is transmitted negatively or positively to the rest
of the world. The reasons for this and other disagreements in the
simulations are examined elsewhere.1° It suffices to repeat that
disagreements with respect to both the sign and magnitude of effects are
common among honorable economists, and are common even within subsets of
models that are supposedly similar in orientation, let alone among
policy-makers.
Computing the policy—makers' reactions requires knowing not
only the perceived policy multipliers, but also the target optimums and
the welfare weights. We adopt the same target values as Oudiz and Sachs
(19814): current accounts of zero for the United States and two percent
of GNP for the non—U.S. OECD, and GNP gaps of zero for both regions.
The baseline values of both variables, specified as part of the— lii—
Brookingssimulation exercise, were below target as of 1985. Thus
policy—makers will seek to Increase both output and the current account.
The targets, together with the baseline values for the variables and any
set of policy multipliers from Table 1, imply corresponding values for
the constant terms A, B, G and H in equations (3)—(6).
The choice of welfare weights u and w is necessarily more
1 4- 4-__ 1-t___ .-1-,-,1-P4- • -. —'C'-t--.
1) .1. ¼ 1 1- y , 'ii, I iai I 11¼) 1. ¼- Ui 4 Up i. uiums•'iUUJ. L a?1U
chose the values that the weights would have had to have held for
countries to have produced the values of output, Inflation and the
current account actually observed In the 1980s, assuming a Nash
non—cooperative equilibrium. For lack of a better alternative, we adopt
the set of weights calculated by Oudiz and Sachs for the EPA model, and
apply it uniformly regardless of model. We do not replicate their
methodology separately with each model, because our welfare comparisons
require a common objective function. But we have examined the
sensitivity of our results to different welfare weights, and to
different optimum values for the targets as well; we found no
qualitative change in the results.11
If the U.S. policy-maker can believe any of the eight models
and the non-U.S. (henceforth "European") policy—maker can believe any of
the eight models, then there are 8 x 861 possible combinations, each
implying a different Nash non-cooperative equilibrium. In Table 2 we
report 6 x 6 =36of them.(8 x 8 is a bit too unwieldly for one
table.)MODEL SUBSCRIBED TO MODEL SUBSCRIBED TO BY EUROPE
BYTHE UNITED STATES
MCM LIV000LVAR OECD LINK HSG
Table 2: Nash Non—cooperative Equilibrium (MonetaryPolicies)
YES YES YES YES YES YES
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10. 553 10. 521
FROM BASELINE
EUR. Y 11.145 —0.615
CA 0.216 —1. 431 —5.
10.0')A 10.291 0.551
US Y 3. 955 3. 946 3. 934
—C'. 232 —0. 321 0. 523
CA —0.137 —0. 212 —0. 246
3. 959 3. 94S
PERCEIVED DEVIATIONOF TARGET
130
. —0. 175 —0. 215
FROM GOAL
EUR. Y 0.445—11.315—2c1.032
CA —1.297 0.256 2.206
—0.656 —0.403 —10. 143





—1.012 —1. 011 —1.025
PERCEIVED GAIN FOR: -2.356-2.851 -2.891
EUR. 1.2296 0.2733 5. 1246
US 0.1673
1.0760 1.0391 0.2243
0.1440 0.17:11 0.1717 0.1562
LIVPOOL











EUR. Y 11.031 —0.516 —2.280
CA 0.572 —1.434 —6.622
8.098 9.394









EUR. Y 0.331—11.216 —12. 980
CA —1.041 0.353 1.429
—2. 602 —0. 806
USY —6. 873 —8. 555 10. 961
—4.307 —1.561


















































































































NASH POINT: STABLE? YES YES YES YES YES YES
STEPS 2 2 2 2
DEVIATION OF NASH
FROM BASELINE .
Me 31.615 —6.075—55.545 48.219 51.774 —8.234
M 4.116 5.106 6.405 3.679 3.586 5.162
PERCEIVED DEVIATION OF TARGET
.
FROM BASELINE
CUR. Y 11. 135 —0. 608 —9. 080 9.920 10. 265 0. 105
CA 0.246 —1. 431 —5. 873 —0. 372 —0. 371 0. 506
US Y 2.s37 1.890 1.174 2.677 2.729 1.859
CA 0.244 —0.363 —1.160 0.511 0.568 —0. 398
PERCEIVED DEVIATION OF TARGET
FROM GOAL
EUR. Y 0.435—11. 308 —19. 780 —0. 780 —0. 435—10. 595
CA —1. 366 0.356 2.173-1.292 —0.942 —0. 535
USY —2.533 —3.080 —3.796-2.293 —2.241 —3. 111
CA —2. 815 —3. 422 —4.218 —2.547 —2.490 —3. 456
PERCEIVED BALMFOR:
EUR. 1.2409 0. 2750 5. 2412 1.0291 1.0780 0.1285































NASH POINT: STABLE? YES YES YES YES
















EUR. Y —0. 608 —9. 045 10. 271 0. 133
CA —1. 431 —5. 877 —0. 330 0.507
USY 1.221 0.084 2.569 1.168
CA —0. 345 —1. 461 0.978 —0. 397
PERCEIVED
FROM GOAL
EUR. Y —11. 308—13. 745 —0. 429—10. 567
CA 0.356 2.174 —0.832-0.533
USY —3. 749 —4.886 —2.01 —3.802




0.2749 5. 2572 1.0804 0.1348






II 38. 815 —7. 497 179. 648 49. 873 50. 782—102. 426
Ms 19.413107.410-248.135 -1.598 —3.326237.785
PERCEIVED DEVIATION OF TARGET
PROM BASELINE
EUR. Y 11. 158 —0.750 9.855 23. 657
CA 0.174 —1.426 —0.480 1.694
US Y 4.367 7.493 3.521 13. 902
CA 3.310 1.214 3.81i —3.083
PERCEIVED DEVIATION OF TARGET
FROM GOAL
EUR. Y 0.458—11.450 —0. 845 12. 957
CA —1.439 0.360 —1.399 0.654
USY —0. 603 2.523 -1.349 8.932
CA 0. 404 —1. 632 0. 905 —5. 989
PERCEIVED GAIN FON:
EUR. 1.2135 0.2422 9.5926 0.9894 1.0663—0. 4466
US 0.7989 0. 5573 —3. 2922 0.7404v.7335—2. 3909






















0.946Table 3: Bargaining Solution
(Movement from Non—cooperative to Cooperative Solution)
MODEL SUBSCRIBED TO MODEL SUBSCRIDEO TO BY EUROPE
BYTHE UNITED STAT
MCM LIVPOOL VAR DECO LINK MSG
LI NH.








0. 162 24. 517 5.006 3.465 7. 124
—1.448—17.479 5.006 4.539 7.291
0.016 2.543 1.377 0.580 1.083
0.034 0.879 0.043 0.011 —0. 680
—0.358 —3.757 1.377 1.221 2.001
0.059 1.215 —0. 077 —0. 094 —0. 116
0. 00030.00030. 32670.0161 0. 00400.0594
0. 00260. 00060. 17430. 02400. 01330. 0529
-
MSG
GARGAINING CHANGE IN POLICY
N —1. 374 0.505-0.374 —13.979
M —3.134—7.884 —1.11637.528
PERCEIVEDCHANGE IN TARGETS
EUR.Y —C'.132 C'.C'SC' —0. 177
CA 0.010 0.094 —0.175
US—--Y- -—-— •.. — --—0.383- —0.553-- ——0. 112
CA —C'. 204 —C'. 033 —0. C'47
PERCEIVEDGAIN FOR:
E'JR. ').C'C'54 0. 0013 0.OC'21 0. 18760.0113 1. 5561
Us 0.0022 0. 0033 0.0203 0. 0731 0. 0200 3.-462
*99INDICATES MORE TI-IAN a':' STEPS REOUIRED FOR CONVEROENCE
MCM







































Mc 0.228 0.000 2.003 1.533 0.737 2.074
—0. 142 0.000 —0. 433 0.364 0.247 0.420
PERCEIVED CHANGE IN TARGETS
EUR. Y C'. 110
— CA
US Y —0. 053
CA 0.003
PERCEIVED GAIN FOR:
EUR. 0. OC'01 0. 000C' C'. OC'63 0. 0011 0. C'OC'2 0.0036
US '). 000') '). 000') 0.0002 0.0002 0. C'C'01 '). 0003
LIVPOOL
BARGAINING CHANGE IN POLICY
Me 0.563 0.417 —1.185 66.45 —5.813 —3.667
M5 —1.447 —5.844 —3.327 122.$iS 19.038 3.054






EUR. 0. 0006 0. 0010 0. 0215 1. 7345 0. 0258 0. 0883
US 0.0131 0.0130 0.08308.40460. 13430.0196 -
VAR
BARGAINING CHANGE IN POLICY
Me —2.039 —0.082 25. 304 —16. 346 —2.704—11. 157
—2.441
PERCEIVEDCHANGE IN TARGETS
—0.349—17.138 14.526 4.423 7.129
EUR. Y -0. 337
CA 0.004
US Y -2. 442
CA 0.053
PERCEIVED GAIN FOR:
EUR. C'. ':'':'z':' C'. C'C'':'l C'. 3556 ':'. '-'62':'0. 0:35 ':'. 0614
US '). 0362 0. O'io3 0.4249 '. 3733 0. 1023 0.0955
OCCO
BARGAINING CHANGE IN POLICY
Me 0.100 11.263 3. 2. t65 3.155







EUR. ':'.C'CC'c. ':'.C'':'':'i ':'.1118 C'.0075 C'.':'':'ic C'.C'SGO



























































MODEL SUBSORIEED TO MODEL SULiSCRIEED TO EY EUROPE
}3YTHE UNITED STTES









ü. 0002 0. oooE 0. 0001 s:. (>0':)
LIVPOOL 0. 4107—o. 3202—0. 1723 o.0210 VR 0. 1054—0. 3 —o. 1829 —i:'.0365
OECD 0. 0259 —0. O0(:)3 —o. 0024 o.008):>
LINK 0. 0371 0. 0109 0. 0039 0. 0242
MSG 0. 1625 —0. (:)133—o. 0107 o. os4s
LIVPOCL
MODEL REPRESENTING RELITY:
MOM 33. 7613 5.3305 o. 3029
LIVPOOL 5.4045 c3.13L3 0.3136 VR 7S.9016.0235 1.7162
CEOD 35.9301 6.1384 0.2323
LINK 14.9634 2.4751 0.3331
MSG 0. 7234 0. 1479 —0. 0951
VcR
MODELREPRESENTING REflLITY:
MOM —0.1035—0. ('009 1. 0198 C>. 6432 Cc.2438—0. 0536
LIVPOOL 0. 385C:) 0. 0217 6.5806 1. 2352 0.0465—0. 9447
VR 0. 0362 0. 0009 0. 4349 C>. 5733 0. 1023 0. 0995
OECD —0. oe. 0.0051 1.7074 3. 3335 0. 1769—0. 3319
LINK —3. 0545 0. 001>:) 1. 0815 o. ois.i o. 0646—0. 2494
N1SG —0. 0451 —0. 0033 1.3550 0. ('595 0.0172—0. 4154
OECD
MODEL REPRESENTING RELITY:
MOM o. O:: 0. 0326 0. 0360
LIVPOOL —0.30 —0. 6158—0. 1307
VflR —0. 9354 —0. 6461 Cc. 0597
OEOD 0. 0123 0. (':cci4 0.




MOM —C'. 0208—0. 0239--o. 0. (3435 o. 0426 C'. 0304
LIVPOOL 3.0573 0.0912 4.2232—1.4711—1.1372--0.4153
VPR 3.0933 —0. 0337—.i. 3223 —1. 7356 —1.5-hiS —0. 1349
OEOD c:. 0o47 -—0. 0004—w 3033—3. chi9 —0. 0415 ——cc. c::0
L_ INK 3. 0036 o. (('(5 Cc.1749C'. o:o cc. :ci:: C'. 0529
MSG —:c. c:coa: —o. 0143 1. -—3. :::i -—0. :309
MOCEL EiE2ENT::5 RE4LITY:
MOM c:. (553. c:s--3.w:4--cc. 7-57 1'. 255275. :6')
LI YPOOL c:.. cs::' 1.1773 3. 115 —1 .('('7') —1. 043340. 7i34
VR 1. 1302 3. 1539—2. 6465—7. 4367—3. 437337. 3571
OECD Cc. 1 459 1,. 7300 —1 . 0053 — 1.'3362 —-'3. 1c9331 12. 0331
LINK 0. ose'31. 10 —c3. 4>77—0. 3513—0. 323753. 7033
iiSb c. _c.3 3. c_cc)33 Cc. (_,_c3 3.—3 0. i(c) .2. —-s:
0. 0()C)C)
o . 0000







































Cc.7470Table 5; TRUE GiINS FROM 000RDINPTION FOR EUROPE
MODEL SUBSCRIBED TO MODEL SUBSCRIBED TO BYEUROPE
BY THE UNI TED STTES




1. 5990 —1.3006 —0. 6650 0. ojoa
().0068 —0.9144 —0. 4306 —0.5601
o.1575 0.0011 —c:'.0031 c:.1024
0. 1865 0. 00800.0002 0. 1022
0.1294 —0. 1425 —0. 0737 o.0036
LIVPOOL
MODELREPRESENTINGREALITY:
MCM o. cx:c 0.0490—0. 067324.6930 1. 0.3986
—0. c:)163o. oclo 0. 951065. 89963.3405 i.. 3406
—0. 0215 —0.1833 0. 0215 —s.5023—o. sess—o. 0560
—0. 0328—o. 1735—0. 1327 1 . 7645 0. 3410—o. 0722 LINK 0. 0125 0. 0331 —0. 0050 1. 8552 0. 0258—o. 0595
iV1SG —0. 0463—0. 2105—0. 0540 5. :524o. s'io o. 0883
VR
MODEL REPRESENTING REflLITY:
MCM 0.0030 0.0100ii. 1863 1. 1339 0.3014 —2. 1764
LIVPOOL 1.0570 0.000125.350812. 6236 2•1972—1.6444 VR 1.4471 0. 1032 0. 3256 0.7633 —0.6664 0.7496
OECD —0. 0738 —0. 0105 1.7854 0.0620 0.0341 —0. 4019
LINK —0. 0365—0. 0021 2. 9039—o. 0572 o.ooz —0. 6731
MSG 0.0929—0. 0051 1.4449 1.1609 o. 1363 0.0614
OECD
MODEL REPRESENTING REPLITY:
MOM C).0006 0. 0383 —o.os(:)3 o.3904
—0.1967 0.0001 —1. 9818—0. 0362
0.1543 0. 0943 —1. 3731 —1. 5926
—o.004c) ——0. 0062 0. 0021 0. 2904
LINK 0.0062 0. 0077 c:. 0016 o.2266
MEG —0.0133—0. 0093 —o.2241 0.0233
LINK
MODEL REPRESENTING RELITY:
MCM 0. 0009 0.0'331 6. 6253—0. 1300—0. 0655 0. 3325
LIVPOOL —0. 2075 0. 000313. 7141 —4. 3333 —3. —o. 1515 VR 0.32360.20900.3257--4. 6755—3. 0413--3. 4599
OECD —-0. 0039 —-0. 0632' 1. :166 o. 0161 0. 0041 0. 4447
LINK 0. 0067 0. 0151 a. 0340 0. 0152' 0. 0040 0. 2959
MSG —0. 0201 —0.0255o. ;'oo —o. 5136 —-0. 394Cc cc. J5'J4
MSO
MODELREPRESENTING REPLITY:
MOM 0.0054 1.0414 —0. 0. i- ci. 565i34. 5772.
1.3657 0.0013 1.039413. 7576 3.008661.3314
2. 3199 4. 4032 o. 0021 —8. 1036.—5. 664775. 3953
—0. 0320 —-c:. 0063—0. 0091 0. 1370 (. 1157 3— 462.5
LINK -—0. 0244 0. 0960 0. 0223 —0.6326 cc. 01 13 1. J 152







































Foreach combination we report first whether the Nash
equilibrium is stable, and the number of moves needed to reach
convergence starting from the baseline.12 We then report the values of
the two countries' variables of' interest in the equilibrium: the money
supply (relative to the baseline), the perceived output and current
account (relative to baseline, first, and then relative to the optimum)
and the perceived welfare function (relative to the baseline). It
usually turns out that both countries think they can do better than the
baseline even without cooperating, but not always. All but two of' the
36 cases call for expansion by one country or the other.
Our main interest lies in the move from the non—cooperative to
the bargaining equilibrium, shown in Table 3. To take one example, if
the U.S. policy-maker believes in the MCM model and the European
policy—maker believes In the OECD model, then they can agree to expand
further their money supplies simultaneously (0.36 percent and 1.59
percent, respectively). They each believe that this policy package will
result in higher output with little adverse effect on their current
accounts. This is the often-mentioned case in which the Nash equilibrium
is too contractionary. But besides the case of simultaneous expansion
(9 combinations of models), every other case Is possible, as well:
European expansion with U.S. contraction (12 combinatIons), U.S.
expansion with European contraction (8 combinations), and simultaneous
contraction (5 cases).
Without knowing the true model, we can not determine whether
any given policy package actually improves welfare. But we can get a— 16—
goodidea of the possibilities by trying out each of the models as a
candidate for the true model. The 36 cells in Tables 14 and 5 correspond
to the same 36 combInations as Tables 2 and 3. But within each cell we
report the effect that the corresponding coordination package of Table 3
would have under each of the 6 models; thus there are 63216
combinations altogether.13 Table 14 shows the actual effect of
coordination on U.S. welfare and Table 5 the effect on European welfare.
Whenever one or the other policy—makers turns out to have had the right
model, his country does gain from coordination. Otherwise he would not
have agreed to the package. For example the Joint monetary expansion
that they agree on when the U.S. policy-maker believes the MCM model
and the European policy—maker believes the OECD model is seen to raise
U.S. welfare if the MCM model is the true one (Table 14) and to raise
European welfare if the OECD model Is the true one (Table 5). It also
turns out to raise both countries' welfare If the LINK model is the true
one. But it turns out to reduce welfare if the LIVPL, VAR or MSG model
is the correct one. The reader who does not believe in one of the
latter three models might not be concerned with that result. But such a
reader should instead be concerned with the result that when the U.S.
policy-maker, for example, believes in the LIVPL model and the European
policy-maker in the VAR model, coordination will reduce welfare
according to each of the other models.114
Altogether there are 83 =512combinations (counting those
with the EEC and MINIMOD models in addition to those shown in the
tables). Coordination turns out to result in gains for the United— 17—
in289 cases, as against losses in 206 cases and no perceptible
(to four decimal places) in 17 cases. For Europe there are gains
in 297 cases, as against losses In 198 cases and no effect In 17 cases.
These figures in
coordination, in





no effect in 12.
a sense overstate the odds in favor of successful
that by construction each country's welfare is improved
worsened) In 1/8 of the combinations, those in which
has the same model as the true one, if we exclude such
take only the 8 x 7 x 6 =336combinations where all
different, the margin is narrower. For the United
gains in 168 cases, as against losses in 156 cases and
For Europe there are gains in 170 cases, losses in 1514
and no effect In 12.
The results thus suggest that the danger that coordination
will worsen welfare rather than improve It Is more than just a
pathological counterexample. It is true, but beside the point, that the
proper strategy, if the correct model could be discovered, would be
simply for both policy—makers to optimize subject to it. The point is
that one cannot, under conditions where policy—makers do subscribe to
different models, make the blanket pronouncement that coordination must
Improve welfare.
Section 3: International Coordination of Monetary and Fiscal Policy
Together
In this section we give each country a second tool, government
expenditure —gfor the United States and g* for Europe. We must add a




attainits optimal point regardless what the other country does. We
choose the inflation rate. Now 214 multipliers are relevant from each
model: the effects of m, m*, g and g* on U.S. output, current account
and inflation and European output, current account and inflation.
Table 6 reports the 214 multipliers for each of the eight
models. There Is not as much disagreement regarding fiscal policy as
monetary policy. A domestic fiscal expansion in most of the models is
transmitted positively to the other country, via a domestic
current account deficit. But a few models have fiscal or monetary
expansion reducing the domestic price level rather than raising It.
We again assume that each country seeks to minimize a
quadratic loss function. Rather than repeating our earlier points in
algebraic form, we turn directly to the simulation results. As before,
the weights and target optimums are taken from Oudiz and Sachs (19811).
The inflation target is zero for both the United States and Europe.
Thus policy—makers will seek to reduce inflation, as well as increase
output and the current account.
Table 7 reports the Nash non—cooperative equilibrium for the
six models.15 The movement from the baseline to the Nash involves
fiscal expansion as often as contraction. (Both fiscal authorities
contract in 9 case, both expand in 9, and only one expands in 18.) But
the money supply Is expanded more often (both central banks contract in
8 cases, both expand in 18 cases, and one expands in 10.)
Table 8 reports the Nash bargaining solution. To take one
example, when the United States subscribes to the LINK model and EuropeTable 6a:Fiscal Policy












U.S. (—Sim. B) Effect in U.S. Effect in Non—U.S.
+1.8%+0.4%+1.7 +2.8%—16.5+8.9+0.4+0.4%+0.7%
EEC 1/ +1.2%+0.6%+1.5 +0.6%—11.6+6.6+0.3+0.2%+0.3%
EPA 2/ +1.7%+0.9%+2.2 +1.9% —20.5+9.3+0.5+0.3%+0.9%
LINK +1.2%+0.5%#0.2 —0.1% —6.4 +1.9 NA—0.0%+0.1%
Liverpool +0.6%+0.2%+0.4 +1.0% —7.0 +3.4+0.1+0.6%—0.0%
MSG +0.9%—0.1%+0.9 +3.2%—21.6 +22.7+1.0+0.5%+0.3%
MINIMOD +1.0%+0.3%+1.1 +1.0% —8.5 +5.5+0.2+0.1%+0.3%
VAR3/ +0.4%—0.9%+0.1 +1.2% —0.5 —0.2—0.0—0.0%—0.0%
OECD +1.1%+0.6%+1.7 +0.4%—14.2 +11.4+0.7+0.3% +0.4%
Taylor 3/ +0.6%+0.5%+0.3 +4.0% NA NA +0.2+0.4%+0.4%
Wharton +1.47+0.3% +1.1 —2.1%—15.4+5.3+0.6—0.1% +0.2%
DRI +2.1%+0.4%+1.6 +3.2%—22.0 +0.8+0.4+0.3%+0.7%
Fiscal Expansion in
Non—U.S. OECD
(Sim. G) Effect in Non-U.S. Effect in U.S.
MM +1.4%+0.3%+0.6 +0.3% —7.2+7.9+0.5+0.2%+0.5%
EEC!! +1.3%+0.8%+0.4 —0.6% —9.3+3.0+0.0+0.1%+0.2%
EPA 2/ +2.3%+0.7%+0.3 —0.7%—13.1+4.7+0.6+0.3%+0.3%
Link +1.2%+0.1% NA —0.1% —6.1+6.3+0.0+0.0%+0.2%
Liverpool +0.3%+0.8%+0.0 +3.3%—17.2 +11.9+0.8+3.1%—0.5%
MSC +1.1%+0.1%+1.4 +2.9% —5.3 +10.5+1.3+0.6%+0.4%
MINIMOD +1.6%+0.2%+0.9 +0.6% —2.2+3.2 +0.3+0.2%+0.1%
VAR3/ +0.5%—0.3%—0.2 —2.4% +1.7 —2.6 +0.2—0.1%+0.3%
OECD +1.5%+0.7%+1.9 +0.9% —6.9+3.3+0.3+0.2%+0.1%
Taylor 3! +1.6%+1.2%+0.6 +2.7% NA NA+0.4+0.9%+0.6%
Wharton +3.2%—0.8% +0.8 —2.4% 5.5+4.7+0.1 0.0%+0.0%
DRI NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1/ Non—U.S. short—term interest rate NA; long—term reported instead.
2/ Non—U.S. current account is Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Canada.
3/ CPINA.GNPdeflatorreported instead.Table 6. Money and Fiscal Multipliers












From a (1 percent)
increase in: U.S. m Eur. m U.S. m Eur. m U.S. m Eur. m
Effect on U.S.
MCM 0.3750 0.0000 —0.0198 0.0006 0.1000—0.0500
Liverpool 0.0250 0.4000 —0.0832 —0.0525 0.9250—0.8500
VAR 0.7500 0.3000 0.0311 —0.0634 0.1000—0.1750
OECD 0.4000 0.0250 —0.0537 0.0147 0.1750—0.0250
LINK 0.2500 0.0250 —0.0380 0.0225 —0.1000 0.0000
MSG 0.0750 0.0750 0.0167 0.0769 0.3750—0.1500
EEC 0.2500 0.0250 —0.0180 0.0122 0.2000 0.0250
MINIMOD 0.2500 —0.0750 0.0179 —0.0089 0.2000—0.1250
Effect on "Europe"
MCM —0.1750 0.3750 —0.0090 0.0090 —0.1500 0.1500
Liverpool 0.0000 0.1000 0.0034 0.2384 0.0000 0.7000
VAR 0.1000 0.1750 0.1169 0.1192 0.0250—0.1250
OECD 0.0750 0.2000 0.0178 —0.0091 —0.0250 0.0750
LINK —0.0250 0.2000 0.0083 —0.0077 —0.0250—0.1500
MSG 0.1000 0.0500 —0.0206 —0.0743 —0.1750 0.3750
EEC 0.0500 0.2000 0.0159 —0.0689 —0.1000 0.2500
MINIMOD —0.0500 0.2000 —0.0226 —0.0173 —0.0500 0.0500
From an increase
(equal to 1% of GNP): U.S. g Eur. g U.S. g Eur. g U.S. g Eur. g
Effect on U.S.
MCM 1.8000 0.5000 —0.4217 0.2019 0.4000 0.2000
Liverpool 0.6000 —0.5000 —0.1791 0.3045 0.2000 3.1000
VAR 0.4000 0.3000 —0.0127 —0.0659 —0.9000—0.1000
OECD 1.1000 0.1000 —0.3628 0.0843 0.6000 0.2000
LINK 1.2000 0.2000 —0.1647 —0.1621 0.5000 0.0000
MSG 0.9000 0.4000 —0.5540 0.2693 —0.1000 0.6000
EEC 1.2000 0.2000 —0.2990 0.0773 0.6000 0.1000
MINIMOD 1.0000 0.1000 —0.2172 0.0818 0.3000 0.2000
Effect on "Europe"
MCM 0.7000 1.4000 0.0912 —0.0737 0.4000 0.3000
Liverpool —0.0000 0.3000 0.4566 —2.3097 0.6000 0.8000
VAR —0.0000 0.5000 —0.0183 0.1559 0.0000—0.3000
OECD 0.4000 1.5000 0.2583 —0.1564 0.3000 0.7000
LINK 0.1000 1.2000 0.0420 —0.1349 0.0000 0.1000
MSG 0.3000 1.1000 0.4246 —0.0991 0.5000 0.1000
EEC 0.3000 1.3000 0.3499 —0.4931 0.2000 0.8000
MINIMOD 0.3000 1.6000 0.1058 —0.0423 0.1000 0.2000Table 7: Nash Non—cooperative Equilibrium (Monetary and Fiscal Policies)
MODELSUBSCRIBED TO MOOEL SUBSCRIBED TO BY EUROPE
DY THE UNITED STRTES


































NRSH POINT: STAbLE? YES YES YES YES YES YES -
STEPS 99 2 99 99 3 99































EUR. Y 6. 853 —0. 164 —2. 723 17. 498 9.043—39. 394
CR —0. 412 —1. 845 —8. 670 —1. 687 —0. 708—50. 453
P —2. 244 —2. 709 —4. 133 —3. 916 —2. 870 —9. 270
US Y 2.081 —3.256 —4.635 6.982 —1.843 15.502
CR 2.299 1.602 1.422 2.939 1.787 4.051
P —3. 124 —0.397 0.308-5.628 —1. 119 —9.981
PERCEIVED DEVIATICNOF TRRSET
FROM GORL
EUR. Y —3. 806—10. 884—13. 423- 6.798 -1. 652 —50. 094
CR —2. 025 —0.059 —0. 619 —2.606 —1. 179—51. 494
P 0.556 0.091 —1. 333 —1. 116 —0.070 —6. 470 US Y —2.889 —8.223 —9. 605 2.012 -6. 813 10.532
CR —0. 377 —1. 074 —1. 254 0.263 —0. 889 1.375
P 1.476 4.203 4.908 —1.028 3.481 -5. 381
PERCEIVED GRIN FOR:
EUR. 2.3065 1.9517 9. 1459 1.2092 2.5290 —384. 0674
US 1.9633 0.2180—0. 5052 2.0396 0.8432—1. 0544
LIVPOOL
NASH POINT: STABLE? YES YES YES YES YES YES
STEPS 99 99 99 99 6 99
DEYIRTICN OF NASH
FROM BASELINE
























EUR. Y 4.454 0.472 —2.379 —17.903 8.225 —1.934
CR —1.710 —1.342 —8.677 11.333 -1.296—11.946
P —1.387 —2.714 —4.143 1.397 —2.304 —4.432
USY —o.903 —3.662 4.3.8 —-2.051 —1.351 —2.369
CA 2.444 0.970 5.273 —0. 24 2.255 1.406
P -. 352 —4. 976 —. 227 —3. 030 —.. 371 —4. 541
PERCEIVED DEVIATIONCF TAROET
FROM GOAL
EUR. Y —6.246-10. 223—13. 579—28. 603 —2.475-12. 624
CR —3. 322 —0. 055 —0. 626 10. 964 —1. 727-12. -307
P 0.913 0.036 —1. 348 4.697 —0. 104 —1. 632
US Y —5.873 —3.632 —0.622—11.021 —6.221 —7.039
CR —3.233 —'..747 —0.342 —6.061 —2.421 —4.311
P —C'. 234 —C'. 376 —C'. 027 —0. '.3': —C'. 271 —0. 341
PERCEIVED GRIN FOR:
EUR. 1.0:14 2.0906 9.0942—25. 7920 2.2528—21. 7531




















































































0.241 6.273 —1. 172







MODEL SUBSCRIBED TO MODEL SUBSCRIBED TO BY EUROPE
DYTHE UNITED STATES












YES YES YES YES









































































































EUR. 1.3299 2. 182611.0793 2.8105




NASH POINT: STABLE? YES YES YES YES





Me 13.625 —0.607—218.097259.271 18.504 7.151 M, 24.752 25.187 19.722 26.012 24.793 24.881
Ge 6.036 0.016 100.706-28.713 5.196 4.470 G —4.172 -4.038 -5.538 —3.912 -4.162 —4.131
PERCEIVED DEVIATIONOF TARGET
FROM BASELINE
EUR. Y 5.608 -0.056 14.158 9.093 8.300
CA —1.096 —1.845 —7.892 1.535
6.492
P —2.056 —2. 710 —2. 457 —2. 536 —2. 876
—3.285
US Y 2.779 1.439 12.974 2.548
—3. 344
CA 1.078 —0.302 11.579 0.840
2.336
P —4.551 —4.538 —4.741 —4.557
PERCEIVED DEVIATIONOF TARGET . —4.s4
FROM GOAL
EUR. Y —5. 092—10. 756 3.458 —1. 607
CA —2.709 —0.058 0.159 0.616
—1. —4. 208




US Y —2. 191 —3.531 8.004 —2.422
—0. 544
CA —2.257 —3.637 8.244 —2.495
—2.264 —2. 634




EUR. 1.7114 1.9795 11.2074 2.7352
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2.336 C'.091 —1. 199
—35. 601 —8. 104 —2.385




* 99INDICATES MORE THAN 20 STEPS REOUIRED FOR CONVERGENCE





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 9: TRUE GflINS FROM COORDINTION FOR US
MODELSUBSCRIBEDTO MODEL SUBSCRIBED TO BY EUROPE
BYTHE UNI TED STTES
MCM LIVPOOL VR OECD LINK MSG
MODEL REPRESENTING REALITY:
MCM 0. 0007 o. 0000 o. 0001 0. cxt: 1 0. 0001 3. 1469
LIVPOOL —417. 0703 —32. ssoo 3. 741583. 0365 —22. 5915 667. '3237
VR —106.6272—7.7687 5.941274.6168—1.1505 1514.1071
OECD —7. 7722 —0. 1183—0. 1502 5.6047 0. 2561 137. 1037




MCtI —1.9039—0. 5021 6.277254. 4563 7.3414 9.8998
LI VPOOL 0. 0001 . 0000 0. 0013 2. 5643 0. 0001 0. 0000
VR —3. 0797—0. 754714. 541173. 8011 '3.8608 5. 8246
OECD —0.4930—0.2207 3.943642.6516 2.6546—1.6866
LINK —1.8294—0.244411.296295.09692.8645 —16.6592
MSG —4.0967—0.316210.1331 105.3657 6.1541—4.7476
VR
MODEL REPRESENTING RELITY:
MCM 0. 5074 C). 1400 133.9095 30.5C)77 —C). 1103 1. 9968
LIVPOOL '35. 1039 0. 6575 7325. 97:>9 210. 175's—0. 716693. 4674
VR 0. 0001 0. 0001 0. 0001 C). 000 1 a. t::OC) 1 0. 0000
OECD —0.23070. 1831 111.620532. 4433—0. 7517 2.0946
LINK 0. 1694 C).071616. 700614.8435 —0. 3587 C).3201
MSG 2. 3140 0: 1051 318. 040c:,29. 4297—0. 1739 4. 1346
OECD
MODELREPRESENTING RELITY;
MCM —3.3503—2. 0147 1.0032 —0. 9966. 3. 1369 0.7415
LIVPOOL —336.3305 --32.7359 154.3106 141.2323 115.2563—:.aias
VR —36.5966—20.31160.576710.861126.6199 8.6341
OECD (.0001 0. 0000 0. 5669 0. 000 1 0. 0001 0. 0001
LINK —10.1591 —7. 0590 0. 2836—0. 3550 6. 4676 3. 0614
MSG —7.0943 —18.4216—1.6533 1.471735.133613.3315
L INK
MODEL REPRESENTING RELITY:
MOM --3. 1205—0. )3 ::'. 3364 —'3. 3513—1. 8124—0. 6074
LIVPOOL —1Y. 1358—3.U0Li"3403. 922 1-52l.2923 -34. 345G. --52357
VR --9. 7s —0. 8703 150. 244 —' i3.1368 —4.3254 1.3500
OECD —7.3673--0. 3444 31 -. 7293-5. 1138-4. 4793—0. 1211
LINK 0. ('001 a. :o': 1 C. 3334 0. 0000 a. OOC> 1 0. 0001
M3G --21. 733? —1.i.1 13. 1i16 -1.0192—3. a —0. 3625
'1S G
PiODEL REPRESENTING REL I T'(:
MOM 100. 3656—0. 3932 a. 5411 2. 071+1 C). 1030—0. 5552
LIVPOOL 3ã'C)7. 6754 0. 041450. 651942. 6335 0. 7561 —12. 139
VR 363. 2930—0. 47334. 13o13. 2235—0. 0595—0. 8929
OECD 209. 6473 —0.0625 0.7413 3.4353 —0. 334C)—0. 5277
LINK 28. b763 0.24150.4119 0.2273—0. 1055 0.3096












Table 10;TRUE GRINS FROM COORDINATION FOR EUROPE
MODEL9UBSCRIL3ED TO MODEL SUBSCRIBED TO BY EUROPE
BY THE UNITED STPTES
MCM LIVPOOL VR DEOD LINK MSG
MCM
o.0001 —5.7115 6. 2052—0. 5567 —10. 0076 1046. 2591
—1789.9261 0.00023.93371033.6325 —31.6800 7487. 1062
—139. 4767 —5. 7958 0.0001104.1679 3. 0774 846. 5881
—0.9016 0.2703 4.2436 0.0001 —1.8627 631. 8359
LINK —106. 4474 0.6730 3.578663. 315')0.0002 680. 4074
MSG —206.7456—5.75290.1807 126.3151 —25.2457 341.6131
L I VP 0 DL
MODEL REPRESENTING REALITY:
MOM 0. 0001 —0. 304015. 229035. 9654—6. 7729 —12. 7178
LIVPCOL —23. 55330.0001 —19. 8033 315. 2757 —69. 1323 —20. 6ii
VR —5. 5930—0. 0922 0. 008458. 4799—0. 504211. 17S3
OECD —0. 6888—0. 1327 6. 730322. 2700—7. 6506—s. 3153
LINK —0. 5156 0. 0171 2. 552264. 6068 0. 0003 —21. 9587




MCM 0.0003 0. 0155 1.5533 10. 1595 0. 732,320S03
51.6531 0.0001 3039.1691 219.6790 4.212844.5563
—0.5486 C. 0138 0.000224. 0867 0.0444 —0. 5179
4.5541 0.0853 276.3468 0.0003 1.414911.2411
3.1549 —C>. 0141143. 6578 25.8744 0.0001 1.0776
MSG 4. 1138 o. 0395 344. 745774. 2334 0. 13535 0. 0040
OECD
MODEL REPRESENTING REPLITY:
0.001)2 --13. 5244 1.6689 6. 5260 7.23132 —18. 9440
LIVPOOL —860. 9932 0. 0013 208. 65137275.0462 —213. 5220 —42. 0360
VPR —64.0132—7. 69850.0310 7.224310. 967413. 4161
OECD —2. (YJ32—4. 009320. 1705 0. 0003—0.13968 —19. 1384
LINK —52. 5301 —0. 43379.4823 10.4913 0.0002 —2. 6157
MSG —120. 0177 —;o. 0802—2. 1304ZS.8701 —0. '34 12 o. 0000
LINK
MODEL REPRESENT I NO REPL I Ti':
MOM 0.0001 —0. 303739•4058—-141. 9304 0. 2056 3.2545
-413.3724 0.000221063. 9433—3458. 4715 —1.3. 3375 —10. 326
—12. :::s —0. 3205 2. 3575--171.3356 —5. 3763 4. 1767
—-s. 03c_20. 0724 123..3096 o. oo>i ——1.2477—3. 0702
LINK 0. 11390.0326 785.509 —254.2382 0.0002 —1. 7703
MSG —0.5353 —0.64u: 2701 . 5394—1 :o.. 7,jo' 1. so 12 0. oo:> 1
MES
MOrELF.EP:EEENTIN6 RERLITY:
MOM 0. 0)3>:)4 0. 25:3—i . 2375 —.1262 —0.312c:> 1
LIVPOOL 12112. 2139 0.00(3277. 9536 233. 5333 —12. 107:—34. 7333
VPR 332. 0503-—0. 2717 0.000111.9010—0. 9534 0. 0312
DEED 76. 4-333 :. 0533 3.5728 0. 0000—0. 3134—1. 3533
LINK 761.0515 0.2519 5.9392 3. 7293 0. 0002 —0.3501
MOD 1031>. 341:3 0. 0300—i. 329347. 432):) —2. 30(19 o . 0003— 19—
tothe LIVPL model, the resulting package of coordinated policy changes
takes exactly the form urged by many economists in the 1980s:a U.S.
fiscal contraction, accompanied by a fiscal expansion in the rest of the
OECD and monetary expansion all around.16 This package is considered
desirable because it would depreciate the dollar and reduce the U.S.
current account deficit (and European and Japanese surplus) without
causing a large world recession.17 But most other possible kinds of
policy packages occur as well: U.S. fiscal contraction and monetary
expansion accompanied by either European expansion (6 cases) or European
fiscal contraction and monetary expansion (9 cases); general U.S.
contraction accompanied In Europe by either general expansion (1 case),
loose fiscal and tight money (3 cases), tight fiscal, loose money (3
cases) or general contraction (1); general U.S. expansion accompanied in
Europe by either general expansion (3), monetary expansion and fiscal
contraction (1), or general contraction (1); and, finally, U.S. fiscal
expansion and monetary contraction accompanied In Europe by either
general expansion (1), fiscal expansion and monetary contraction (2),
fiscal contraction and monetary expansion (2), or general contraction
(3)18
Tables 9 and 10 show the true gains from coordination for the
U.S. and Europe, respectively. Again we find that coordination
necessarily improves U.S. welfare if the U.S. model turns out to be the
correct one, and European welfare if the European model turns out to be
the correct one, but that otherwise welfare can go down. Of the
total 512 combinations of all eight models, the United States has gains— 20—
in282 cases, losses in 228, and no perceptible effect In 2. Europe has
gains In 283 cases, losses in 219, and no effect In 10. If we take only
the 336 combinations where the U.S. model, European model and true model
are all different, bargaining results in U.S. gains In 183 cases and
losses in 153, and for Europe gains in 166 cases and losses in 170.
Thus the odds for successful coordination appear to be no better when
policy-makers can take advantage of the monetary—fiscal mix than when
the degree of monetary ease is alone at stake.
Section U: Extensions
This paper has made the simplest assumptIons to examine the
topic at hand. But many extensions suggest themselves. Most have to do
with the introduction of uncertainty, which would seem to come
hand-in—hand with the consideration of disagreement regarding the true
model. We here briefly discuss four such possible extensions.
To begin with, even if we retain our assumption that each
policy-maker believes in his own model with certainty, he may be
uncertain as to the model in which the other policy—maker believes. In
the present paper it was assumed that each observes directly the other's
policy settings, money supplies or government expenditures, so that each
has no need to know the other's model. (Each could infer the other
government's model from its policy actions, if it cared to.) But one
could assume instead that the policy-maker does not observe the foreign
governments policies continuously (think of the central bank's Ml
target, as opposed to current Ml) and that when it is making its— 21—
decision,it must guess what the other might do based on (uncertain)
guesses as to the other's model. Then the policy—maker will set its
policies so as to maximize expected welfare, a weighted average of the
economic consequences of each of the policy-settings that the foreign
government would choose under each of the possible models in which it
might believe. The foreign government's policy settings in turn will
depend, not just on its model, but also on its beliefs about what the
first country's model, and therefore its actions, might be. So the
ordinary Nash equilibrium involves an extra degree of simultaneity.
The U.S. central bank chooses m to minimize
8* *
w(m1, m. )
where1TI* is the U.S. estimate of the probability that Europe believes
in model I and rnj* Is the money supply Europe will pick if it believes
In model I. If the U.S. central bank believes In, for example, model 1,
then the first order condition is similar to equation (7), but with the









where jr'isthe row vector of irj and m* Is the column vector of mj*
(each for 1=1,8, assuming eight possible models).— 22—




where vj is the European estimate of the probability that the United
States believes in model i, and mi is the money supply the United States
will pick if it believes in model I. If the European central bank
believes in, for example, model 2, then the first order condition is
(8') m2 = + R2(ii'm)
where it'isthe row vector of itjandin is the column vector of in1.We
have one version of equation (7') for each of the eight models in which
the U.S. central bank might believe, giving
(7") M +N(lr*fm*)
and similarly for Europe,
(8") m =Q+R(ir'm)
where N, N, Q and R are the vector forms of M1, N1, Q1 and
respectively. Substituting and solving,
(12) m =[I
—Nrr*?RirJ_l[+ Nir'Q}
(13) rn* = — Rir?Nit*?}[+ Rw'M]
where I is the identity matrix.
Equations (12)—(13) represent the 8x8 computable Nash
non—cooperative solutions for the 8x8 combinations of models in which
the two policy—makers could believe. As a concrete example we could try
putting equal weight on each of our eight Brookings models:
=irj=1/8(1=1,8). The bargaining solution remains the same as
before, assuming that each policy—maker reveals his model as part of the— 23—
cooperativebargain. As before we could calculate in each case the gain
or loss in welfare entailed in the move from one equilibrium to the
other, where the true effect of any given pair of money supplies is
judged by each of the eight models in turn.
The second extension would view policy-makers as not so
stubborn as to believe in their own models with certainty. Now they
assign some probability to the possibility that each of the eight models
may be true, and choose their policies so as to maximize expected
welfare, as in Brainard (1967).19 In a simple version we could go back
to assuming that each knows the views of the other policy-maker (now a
set of probabilities). We could even assume that each modifies in a
Bayesian manner his own beliefs when he learns the beliefs of the other
player. However if each is so reasonable as to base his beliefs solely
on the statistical estimator that optimally combines the data available
to him with that available to the other player, then each will come to
the same conclusion. To get disagreement about the model ——andit is
the premise of this line of research that such disagreement is an
accurate description and crucial characteristic of the actual
policy—making environment -—ItIs necessary that the policy—makers have
either Incomplete access to each other's data or (what can be thought of
as much the same thing) different Bayesian priors.
The third extension would be to assume both uncertainty about
the true model (as in the second extension) and uncertainty about what
probabilities the other policy—maker assigns to the models (as in the
first extension). Here it would be possible to assume that the— 2I—
policy-makersoriginally shared the same priors, but that they have
observed different sets of data and have come to different conclusions
for that reason. Let Z1 be the set of data from which U.S. economists
obtained the maximum likelihood point estimates of the parameters that
we have been calling model 1. Such estimates come with standard errors
that imply (in terms of classical statistics) the probabilities that one
couldhave observed Z1 condItIonal on each of the other models in fact
being true, or (in terms of Bayesian statistics) the probabilities that
each of the models could in fact be true conditional on theknown fact
thatZ1has been observed. Similarly if Z2 is the set of data from
whichEuropean economists obtained a maximum likelihoodestimate that we
havebeen calling model 2, then Bayesian methods will give us
(conditional on Z2 and a set of priors, which may be thesame as the
U.S.set of priors) European probabilities that each of the models is
true.Then each policy-maker will choose his money supply so as to
maximize expected welfare, taking into account all the different data
sets that the other central bank could have drawn and the money supplies
that it would consequently set, and also taking into account the
different possible true models and the consequent etfects on the
macroeconomy. The interesting application of Bayesian principles comes
in the realization that the two kinds of uncertainty are not independent.
The probability that a given action by the foreign central bank will
have the consequences implied by model 2 is greater if that action is
the one that would be optimally chosen based on the observation of the— 25-
dataset Z2, i.e., that data set that would imply model 2 as the maximum
likelihood estimate.
These three extensions are more elaborate models of the Nash
non—cooperative equilibrium, but none offers an evident reason for
altering our conclusion that the bargaining solution is as likely to
reduce welfare as to improve it. For those interested in making
coordination work, it is natural to ask whether there might not be some
other cooperative solution concept (that is, mapping from the players'
beliefs and welfare functions to their policy settings) that would turn
out to Improve welfare by light of the true model more often than does
the Nash bargaining equilibrium in Tables 14 and 5.
Under certain conditions, the weighted average of two
statistical estimators will be a better estimator of a parameter than
either considered alone. If the policy—makers' models are treated as
different statistical estimators of the true model, it might be better
to channel the bargaining process to focus on parameters rather than
directly on policy settings, and then to set policy so as to maximize
joint welfare under the compromise model. It is not obvious what is the
relevant stage at which to "average to get the best parameter estimate."
Do we want the best estimates of the structural parameters such as the
elasticities of money demand? The best estimates of functions of those
such as the reduced form money multipliers C and D? Functions of those
like the reaction parameter N? These alternatives are not equivalent
because the functions are nonlinear. If, following the Nash bargaining
solution, the goal is to maximize the product of the countries' expected— 26—
weifare gains relative to the Nash noncooperative equilibrium, then the
first-order conditions turn out to be stated in terms of expected
products of multipliers such as E(CH), the expectation (based on
available data) of the product of the multiplier of U.S. money on U.S.
income and the multiplier of European money on U.S. income. If we were
willing to think of each model's estimate of CII as being equal to the
true CH plus an independent random error (which could be either of equal
or different variances across models), then the best estimate of CII
conditional on any two available models 1 and 2 would be a weighted
average of their estimates e(CH)1 +(1—e)(CH)2(with either equal or
unequal weights, as appropriate). The coordinating agent would then
calculate the value of in and m* that satisfied the first order
conditions in terms of these averaged multiplier-products, and would
instruct the two central banks to adopt those monetary policies,
assuming they wish to avoid a breakdown to the Nash non-cooperative
equilibrium. The extension of the present line of research would be to
calculate the effects of such compromises by using, again, each of the
eight models as possible true models, and to see if the result is an
improvement in the countries' welfare levels any more often than when
the conventional Nash bargaining solution Is used. If so, the
prescriptive implication would be that policy—makers in OECD or G—7
meetings might better spend their time debating directly their views of
the world, rather than debating only over the policies that they would
like each other to adopt.— 27-
Itis not a matter of deciding whether the treatment in the
present paper is adequate. Extensions such as those sketched in this
section need to be pursued. It is only a matter of sorting out which
extensions are highest priority, a process In which we trust some of our
readers will assist.FOOTNOTES
Hamada (1976) is generally credited with the birth of the topic in
its modern analytic form (though under the assumption of fixed
exchange rates). More recent contributions Include Canzonerl and
Gray (1983). Miller and Salmon (1985), Rogoff (1985) and Buiter and
Marston (1985). For good introductions to the literature and
further references, see Oudiz and Sachs (19811) or Cooper (1985).
2There are two important qualifications to the generality of the
proposition that coordination improves welfare under the standard
assumption that policy—makers know the true model. The first Is
that if policy-makers have enough independent instruments to reach
their optimum target goals regardless of each others' actions, then
coordination is moot. The second is that Rogoff (1985) and Kehoe
(1986) have shown that if coordination reduces governments' ability
to precommit to anti—inflationary policies, credibly to their own
peoples, then it can reduce welfare. The present paper is a
counterexample along very different lines.
3Oudlzand Sachs (198'!) and Ishli, McKibbin and Sachs (1985).
The project was entitled "Empirical Macroeconomics for
Interdependent Economic." Frankel (1986a) discusses the
disagreements among the 12 models.
5Indeed many of the authors in the coordination literature decline to
take any position at all on whether the problem with the Nash
non—cooperative equilibrium is that it is too contractionary or too
expansionary, etc. They leave it for econometriclans to fill in the
correct parameter values at some later date.
6One's intuition is that players who disagree about the model will
find it harder to agree on a package of joint policy changes. The
correct way to interpret this intuition is probably that, even if
there exists a bargaining solution that is believed Pareto—superior
to the non—cooperative solution, It will be harder for the players
to agree on a mechanism to enforce the bargaining solution if they
do not share a common view of the world. In an Interesting account
that he believes may carry lessons for macroeconomic coordination,
Cooper (1986) describes the history of International cooperation in
the sphere of public health; cooperation was first proposed early In
the 19th century, but because there were conflicting schools of
thought on whether diseases were carried internationally by
travelers, actual cooperation did not take place until a consensus
was achieved around 1900 as to the correct model of the transmission
of disease. If there are positive costs to an enforcement mechanism
and some parties believe the gains from coordination are small, then
it will not take place.—F 2—
7This holds in the eight econometric models considered in the
following section except the LIVPL and MSG models.
8More often, It has been private economists, and the governments of
smaller countries, who have urged such coordinated expansion; e.g.,
Bergsten, et al (1982). The 1981-814 Reagan Administration opposed
coordination.
9In equations (3)and(14), one could simply redefine m* as fiscal
policy, and let y y, x x, and .Aslong as the two
policy-makers have different parameter estimates, there will still
be scope for coordination. The only difference is that in Figure 2
the true optimal points P and 0 would coincide.
10 The positive effect of a monetary expansion on the current account
via currency depreciation is offset by a negative effect via higher
income. In the Mundell-Fleming model the positive effect on the
current account must dominate, to match the net capital outflow that
results from lower interest rates, giving negative transmission
abroad. But in more modern models the net capital flow may be
reversed, In response to perceived overshooting of the exchange rate.
The theoretical literature contains many other ways of reversing the
Mundell—Fleming transmission results as well. (See Mussa (1979) or,
for an optimizing approach, Svensson and vanWijnbergen(1986)). On
the models used in the Brookings simulations, see Frankel (1986a),
or other papers In Bryant and Henderson.
11 The alternative weights tried were: first, equal weight on both
targets and, second, a weight of 20 times greater on the current
account than on GNP (for both countries). Different targets tried
were: a GNP target 95% of the baseline level for the US, and a GNP
target of 95% of the baseline level for Europe. For these
experiments, the magnitude of the changes in targets and instruments
was the same as in the example presented. The total count for true
gains and losses for the two countries were:
Relative weight ü Casesof:




y95% of baseline 169 163
y =55%of baseline 180 163—F 3-
12 There is only one case of technical instability, the combination of
the MSG and VAR models. In this case the U.S. reaction function is
steeper than the European reaction function because the transmission
effects are strong relative to the own multiplier effects.
13 The diagonal entries of the three—dimensional matrix are the cases
where both policy—makers have the correct model. The calculations
correspond conceptually to those in Oudiz and Sachs (19811) for the
MCM and EPA models.
111 The most bizarre combination occurs when the U.S. believes the LIVPL
model and Europe believes the OECD model. Under this combination,
the Nash non—cooperative equilibrium entails a mutually destructive
increase in the European money supply of almost 100 percent and
decrease in the U.S. money supply of over 100 percent C!)
(Evidently the problem is that the Liverpool model shows European
monetary expansion raising U.S. output much more than does U.S.
monetary expansion, as can be seen in Table 1.)
15 All combinations show technical stability, but convergence is slow
in several cases.
16 Examples include Blanchard and Dornbusch (19814), Layard et al (19811)
and Marris (1985).
17 Table 8 shows that according to the MSG model this change in the
monetary/fiscal mix, though increasing non-U.S. output 0.1 percent
and having the desired effect on the current accounts, would in fact
reduce U.S. output 0.7 percent. There are several other
combinations in the table where this same change in mix results from
coordination, all of them involving the LIVPL model; but none of
them shows quite the expected effects on the target variables.
18 As in the case of coordination of monetary policy alone, there are
a few cases of absurdly large changes, in particular the two
combinations with the MSG and MCM models. The explanation, again,
is that these changes offset absurdly large changes implied by the
move from the baseline to the Nash equilibrium in Table 7.
19 Brainard assumed a continuous probability distribution for the
parameters (rather than assigning discrete probabilities to 12
models, as suggested here). Roubini (1986) applies this assumption
to international coordination.REFERENCES
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